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Social capital and post-IPO firm performance:  




This paper explores the links between entrepreneurs’ social capital and post-IPO firm 
performance in China’s unique capital market and regulatory setting. Using hand-
collected data on entrepreneurs’ political connections and firm financial information, we 
construct original measures for various types of social capital and examine their roles in 
determining the accounting and financial performance of entrepreneurial firms after an 
IPO. On one hand, firm accounting performance is enhanced by entrepreneurs’ bridging 
social capital such as political connections or a willingness to share power with external 
investors. On the other hand, bonding social capital such as intra-group related party 
transactions causes performance to decline. A similar effect exists on financial 
performance, such as a 3-year post-IPO abnormal stock return. Board size or 
independence, however, does not explain firm performance. The results suggest that 
entrepreneurs’ social capital serves a positive governance role in the capital market. 
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This paper investigates the performance of Chinese entrepreneurial firms going 
public in the Chinese stock market, in order to address two important questions raised in 
the IPO literature (Ritter & Welch, 2002): what drives post-IPO performance, and can it 
be predicted? Using hand-collected data from China’s unique regulatory context, we 
construct an original measure of entrepreneurial firms’ social capital by reference to the 
theory of social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) and examine 
its impact on post-IPO firm performance. Our research attempts to shed more light on 
these two important issues in entrepreneurial firm performance.  
The finance literature has been reporting a deterioration in entrepreneurial firms’ 
performance after an IPO, for a number of reasons: (1) entrepreneurs’ pursuit of private 
benefits, (2) window-dressing of the accounts before going public, and (3) timing the IPO 
to coincide with periods of unusually good performance. Some researchers use agency 
theory to seek to understand this post-IPO performance drop, focusing on firms’ 
ownership-related corporate governance features. Jain and Kini (1994), for example, 
show that ownership retention by pre-offering shareholders is positively related to post-
IPO accounting performance. In contrast, Mikkelson et al. (1997) use certain ownership-
related proxies, such as shareholding concentration, existence of blockholders or 
secondary sales, and show that not all of these factors can explain the decline in post-IPO 
accounting performance. Since the empirical evidence is far from conclusive, we propose 
a new measure to examine IPO performance -- entrepreneur’s social capital in the context 
of China.  
Pure agency theory1 may not be relevant to Chinese entrepreneurial firms, where 
the relationship network (Guanxi) or informal governance is often important. We 
therefore explore the potential of such informal governance mechanisms, by transplanting 
social capital theory from sociology into finance. Adler and Kwon (2002) define social 
                                                
1 In contrast to the agency problem when ownership is diffused, the main conflict in China is between 
controlling and minority shareholders, because controlling shareholders have highly concentrated 
ownership (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). According to Bae et al. (2012), controlling shareholders’ incentives 
to expropriate minority shareholders are the key channel through which corporate governance affects firm 
value. 
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capital as a mechanism to capture the collective actions and resultant outcomes associated 
with inter-individual interaction between groups. In their pioneering work applying social 
capital theory in an organizational setting, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) propose that 
social capital is “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or 
social unit” (p. 243). Adler and Kwon (2002) present two distinctive views of social 
capital: the first reflecting an actor’s relations with other external actors, and the second 
related to the structure of relations between actors in a collectivity. “A focus on external 
relations foregrounds what has been called "bridging" forms of social capital, whereas a 
focus on internal ties within collectivities foregrounds "bonding" forms of social capital” 
(p. 19). 
Building on all this theoretical work, we expand the scope of proxies to capture 
various dimensions of the entrepreneur’s social capital. For bridging social capital, we 
focus on two major attributes (the existence of a political connection and social 
relationship with external investors). These external relationship features of social capital 
are relevant in emerging markets in general, and in China in particular, for two reasons. 
First, the existing studies on entrepreneurship in emerging economies show that 
entrepreneurs’ capability of creating an effective political network is a key success factor 
in those contexts (Ireland, Tihanyi, & Webb, 2008; N. T. B. Le & Nguyen, 2009; Morck 
& Yeung, 2004); and second, the existing literature also confirms that in emerging 
markets, because of the prevalence of large blockholders, the type II agency problem 
(conflicts between large shareholders and minority investors) eclipses the traditional type 
I agency problem between owners and managers (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, & 
Shleifer, 1999; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The way the entrepreneur/controller deals with 
external shareholders before and after an IPO thus becomes a key component of bridging 
social capital in such a context. For bonding social capital, we focus on whether the 
entrepreneur/controller emphasizes networking in his/her controlled business group 
through intra-group related party transactions. It is common in Eastern Asia (including 
China) for a business group (often a conglomerate) to list part of its business while 
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keeping the rest away from market scrutiny2. Such related party transactions define 
internal boundaries of intra-group firms as a business group.   
By linking entrepreneurs’ social capital attributes to firms’ post-IPO performance, 
this study makes several contributions. First, we propose and construct a new measure of 
entrepreneur’s social capital. This social capital measure, derived from entrepreneurial 
firms’ political connections, is very relevant in China’s unique institutional environment. 
Second, our research reveals that informal governance mechanisms such as relationship-
based social capital play an important role in entrepreneurial firms’ post-IPO 
performance. In contrast, formal governance measures such as board size or 
independence do not provide any explanation for firm performance. This research thus 
sheds some light on the effects of social capital developed by entrepreneurs in an 
emerging market. Third, our proposed measures of bridging and bonding social capital 
separate external and internal relationships, enabling us to understand the different 
governance roles related to disciplining and entrenchment effects. The network of 
relationships or “Guanxi” plays an important role in emerging markets such as China, but 
has been largely ignored in the governance literature.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section develops the 
institutional background of entrepreneurial firm IPOs in China. The third section 
summarizes social capital theory, to develop hypotheses on the relationships between 
bridging and bonding social capital and the post-IPO performance of listed 
entrepreneurial firms. The fourth section presents the sample, the data source and 
construction of the variables. The fifth section discusses the results of our empirical 
analysis. Conclusions are finally drawn in the sixth section, along with theoretical and 
practical implications, limitations, and future research directions. 
Institutional Background of entrepreneurial firm IPOs in China 
 
                                                
2 One explanation is offered by Khanna and Palepu (2000). They argue that when the institutions that 
contribute to the efficiency of input and output markets are under-developed, family firms and business 
groups can act as substitutes for external capital and labor markets, ultimately mitigating market failures 
caused by agency and information problems. 
 6 
The stock market has gained considerable momentum in China since the early 
1990s. Chinese shares were valued at 21.15 trillion yuan (2.79 trillion US dollars) on 
August 9, 2007, exceeding the nation’s previous-year GDP for the first time3. At the end 
of October 2011, 2,304 companies are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges, with total market capitalization of 24.30 trillion yuan (3.86 trillion US 
dollars). As stated by the Chinese government, the main purposes of launching the stock 
market twenty years ago were to raise much-needed capital for state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), and to facilitate SOEs’ restructuring as “modern corporations” (gongsihua in 
Chinese). Financing through the Chinese equity markets thus shows a tremendous bias in 
favor of SOEs over non-SOEs. However, the number of privately-owned firms listed on 
the Chinese stock market has still increased substantially, in both a reflection and a 
consequence of general private sector development. 
China’s first privately-owned listed company appeared in 1992, but during the 
period 1992-1997 the number of privately-owned listed companies was negligible 
compared to the rapid increase in market capitalization and the total number of listed 
companies. In 1997, fewer than 6% of listed companies were privately-owned, despite 
the private sector’s increasing importance in the Chinese economy. 1998 then saw the 
start of a boom in privately-owned listed companies. As of 2007, 491 (34%) of the 1,453 
publicly listed firms were private firms, some being privatized former SOEs and some 
newly-founded within the private sector. For this study, only the second group - 
entrepreneurial firms - are included in the sample. Since private ownership in China was 
given a new lease of life and all private companies were built from scratch only after the 
economic reform of 1978, the founders of these firms are still actively involved in their 
management, and de facto control the companies. 
Consistent with the important role played by the Chinese government in China’s 
economic reform, the government is heavily involved in the stock market as regulator. 
Due to certain unique features of the regulatory setting in the Chinese stock market, our 
sample provides a good research laboratory to study IPOs. 
                                                
3 “Mainland Stocks become world giants after defying global rout”, South China Morning Post, August 15, 
2007, p. B20. 
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Firstly, due to the IPO approval system in China it is very difficult for a firm to 
obtain listing status. Every proposed IPO must be approved by the CSRC’s Public 
Offering Examination Committee, and the process is lengthy. The firm must first go 
through a so-called "restructuring period", when it is restructured into a limited stock 
corporation. This period lasts a minimum of one year for a firm which was already a 
corporation; for other firms it can last up to three years. Then comes a one-year 
"tutorship" period, during which the firm adopts modern corporate governance structures. 
After these two stages, the firm will be examined by the CSRC’s Public Offering 
Examination Committee mainly in terms of the companies’ ownership structure, large 
shareholders, quality of accounting information and growth prospects. This process lasts 
for six months. If the firm qualifies, the stock exchange (there are two in China, Shanghai 
and Shenzhen) will work with it to arrange the IPO. So if all goes well, it takes a firm on 
average 3 years to prepare for an IPO. The maximum can be more than 4.5 years4. 
Furthermore, the process can be interrupted and prolonged by macroeconomic policy 
considerations. Since SOEs often benefit from preferential “fast-track” listing, our sample 
excludes such companies, and only comprises purely private entrepreneurial firms.  
Secondly, Chinese IPOs cannot involve secondary share sales (when existing 
shareholders sell their shares), and only new shares can be issued to the public. The lock-
in period for the largest shareholders is 3 years, the longest in the world, and the 
controlling shareholder is not allowed to sell his shares for all of that time. This unique 
regulation means that controlling shareholders do not actually sell their equity ownership. 
For each firm included in our study, we clearly identify the controlling shareholder, who 
is the entrepreneur/founder of the firm. The top management team is often the founder 
him/herself, plus family members or delegates close to the family. Therefore, for our 
whole six-year study period around the IPO (three years before and three years after the 
IPO), the entrepreneur/founder/controlling shareholder is the force behind all the major 
decisions made by newly-listed entrepreneurial firms. Further evidence of this control 
structure is found in the firm’s disclosed filing statements.  
                                                
4 Since the Chinese stock market was not doing well in the period 2002-2006, for some firms in our sample 
the whole process took four or even five years. 
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Our sample only includes entrepreneurial firms going through initial public 
offerings. Entrepreneurial companies, unlike their state-owned counterparts, have full 
autonomy to make their IPO decision, meaning that the decision is not driven entirely by 
political considerations. Therefore, their IPO motivations are largely consistent with 
those documented in US studies. The extant literature shows that the two prominent 
reasons for IPOs are (1) raising funds to further grow the firm and (2) creating a public 
market for entrepreneurs’ (and other shareholders’) to cash in their shares (for details, see 
the literature review by Ritter and Welch (2002) (p. 1796) and the CFO survey by Brau 
and Fawcett (2006)). Furthermore, Chinese regulatory restrictions such as the prohibition 
of secondary sale during the IPO and the ensuing 3-year lock-in period make immediate 
cashing in during or just after an IPO impossible for the entrepreneur. Therefore, if the 
main motivation for an IPO is to create a public market so the entrepreneur can cash in 
his investment in the future, a rational entrepreneur should only open up the minimum 
required capital to external investors, just enough to achieve listed status; opening the 
capital wider should signal the entrepreneur’s willingness to develop a better and stronger 
relationship with external investors (“bridging”). 
Literature Review and Hypotheses  
 
To explain the impacts of social capital on listed entrepreneurial firms’ post-IPO 
performance, this study uses the two types of social capital: bridging social capital and 
bonding social capital. 
Social Capital Theory 
  
Social capital is created through social relations that can be mobilized to facilitate 
the attainment of the resources, influence, and sponsorship needed (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Social capital is embedded in relationships that facilitate collaboration and cooperation to 
achieve mutual benefits. Network relationships include feelings of gratitude, reciprocity, 
respect, and friendship (Carolis, Litzky, & Eddleston, 2009). Other researchers (Dess & 
Shaw, 2001) point out that firms’ social capital can be difficult to quantify, since social 
capital reflects not only a complex set of dynamic relationships within a group, but also 
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the unique circumstances and interactions between the group and its external 
environment. 
According to Adler and Kwon (2002), social capital is a form of capital because it 
has the following six features: 1. It is a long-lived asset into which other resources can be 
invested, with the expectation of a future flow of benefits. 2. It is both appropriable and 
convertible. 3. It can either be a substitute for or can complement other resources. 4. It 
needs maintenance. 5. Some forms of social capital are collective goods, in the sense that 
they are not the private property of those who benefit from them. 6. Investments in the 
development of social capital do not seem amenable to quantified measurement. 
Being embedded in a network promulgates mutual knowledge and recognition 
(Bourdieu, 1985). The benefits derived from a firm’s social capital can take the shape of 
tangible and intangible assets, i.e., funding and financial information (Jonsson & 
Lindbergh, 2011). They are sources of information and opportunities, and in certain 
circumstances may be used as a form of social status or reputation. Social capital has 
been found to be important in providing legitimacy (H. E. Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), mitigating the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), 
firm growth (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), and preventing failure (Miner, Amburgey, & 
Stearns, 1990; Westhead, 1995). Social capital links the entrepreneur with opportunities 
crucial to a firm’s success (Bull & Willard, 1993; Ellis, 2000), provides support, 
credibility, and contact for entrepreneurs (Ostgaard & Birley, 1996), and facilitates 
innovation and reduces risks (Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994). 
 Since institutions constrain possible opportunities within acceptable boundaries, 
they tend to determine the way entrepreneurs may legitimately explore and exploit 
opportunities (Clemens & Cook, 1999). North (1990) breaks institutions into formal and 
informal institutions. “Formal institutions” refer to the rules, regulations, laws, and 
supporting apparatuses that establish order in economic, legal, and political frameworks. 
“Informal institutions” include the norms, beliefs, values, and similar conventions that 
form the socio-cultural relations in a society. In transitional economies, “while formal 
institutional policies and structures supporting capitalism have steadily emerged, informal 
institutions remain divided between old and new economic systems. By deterring 
widespread adoption of entrepreneurial behavior, informal institutions persisting from the 
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socialist system undermined the transition of formal institutions during the 1990s that 
were intended to promote entrepreneurship. Furthermore, economic turmoil, lack of 
social justice, growing inequality, and deteriorating welfare services have created 
dissatisfaction with the emerging capitalist economic system” (Ireland et al., 2008, p. 
108). Therefore, the social capital (which belongs to informal institutions) becomes even 
more crucial for entrepreneurs operating in such economies.  
In their study on Vietnamese entrepreneurial firms, Le and Nguyen (2009) state 
that “networking is crucial for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly 
in emerging economies as they seek to access resources for development” (p. 867). 
According to Le and Nguyen, in the absence of effective market institutions, networks 
play an important role in spreading knowledge about a firm’s existence and practices. 
Networks also help a firm learn appropriate behavior, and therefore obtain necessary 
support from key stakeholders and the general public. Therefore, personal relationships 
and networks are often seen as an effective substitute for well-established institutions 
(Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Xin & Pearce, 1996). The extant literature suggests that 
networking between entrepreneurs, bankers, government officials, and friends and 
relatives may increase a firm’s legitimacy and play an important role of help to both 
lending institutions and corporate borrowers (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; T. B. N. Le, 
Venkatesh, & Nguyen, 2006; M. Peng, 2001; M. Peng & Luo, 2000). For corporate 
borrowers, networks can act as a vehicle to gain access to resources, information, and 
support from other parties (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). 
 
Bridging Social Capital and Firm Performance 
 
  
 Adler and Kwon (2002) distinguish between bridging and bonding social capital.  
“The bridging view focuses primarily on social capital as a resource that inheres in the 
social network tying a focal actor to other actors. On this view, social capital can help 
explain the differential success of individuals and firms in their competitive rivalry: the 
actions of individuals and groups can be greatly facilitated by their direct and indirect 
links to other actors in social networks” (p. 19).  
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“The bridging form of social capital is most prominent in the entrepreneurship 
literature given its relevance to the formation of new ventures” (Carolis et al., 2009, p. 
529). Burt has suggested that social capital creates an advantage in “... the way in which 
social structure renders competition imperfect by creating entrepreneurial opportunities 
for certain players and not for others” (Burt, 1992, p. 57). Literatures in both 
entrepreneurship (H. Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Birley, 1985; Uzzi, 1996; Walker, Kogut, 
& Shan, 1997) and social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) have stressed the importance of connections and networks 
in the establishment and success of new ventures. 
There are two direct benefits of the bridging form of social capital: information 
and influence. Social capital may facilitate access to information, which is a critical 
component of entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Social 
capital accelerates the timing, relevance, and quality of information (Adler & Kwon, 
2002; Burt, 1992). For example, “individuals with close ties to universities, perhaps 
through alumni associations, may develop relationships with researchers and thus have 
access to information about emerging technologies that can be commercialized. These 
individuals then have early access to promising technologies before this becomes public 
knowledge” (Carolis et al., 2009, p. 530). Another benefit of social capital is influence. 
Individuals may accumulate obligations from others in their network and then call in 
those obligations at a later date.  
Several previous studies find that bridging social capital helps people or firms to 
improve performance in general (Burt, 2004; Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Shaw, Duffy, 
Johnson, & Lockhart, 2005). “The concept explains resources that are leveraged through 
collaborations with external agents” (Aarstad, Haugland, & Greve, 2010, p. 1003).  In 
fact, Burt (1992, p. 8) names social capital as “... the structure of the player’s network and 
the location of the player’s contacts in the social structure of the arena [that] provides ... 
[an] advantage”. 
In the context of transitional economies, among all the forms of bridging social 
capital, those linked to the political sphere attract particular interest from researchers. In 
their work on Central and Eastern Europe, Ireland, Tihanyi et al. (2008) emphasize the 
importance of studying the impact of politico-economic systems on entrepreneurs’ 
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behavior, and argue that interactions between political and economic systems remain 
especially salient in emerging and transitional economies. “Understanding the economy 
is not possible without taking into account the political system and the ease with which 
changes may occur in it” (p. 109). They further comment that “the attitudes of political 
actors toward entrepreneurship have significant implications for how value (in all forms) 
is produced, distributed, and exchanged throughout a society” (p. 110). The 
predominantly political dimension in entrepreneurs’ social capital in this context may be 
explained by certain features common to all emerging countries, and other features 
unique to transitional economies. 
On one hand, as mentioned earlier, most emerging countries have weak formal 
institutions. Recent research argues that substitutive informal institutions exist in 
environments where formal institutions are either not routinely enforced, or state 
structures are weak and lack authority (Helmke & Levitsky, 2003; North, 1990). For 
instance, in post-Soviet Russia, managers draw on an extensive network of connections 
and relationships governed by informal norms of reciprocity (“You help me, and I’ll help 
you”) to find a way around formal procedures; such connections are useful for arranging 
favorable borrowing terms, postponing payments, jumping queues, speeding up bank 
operations, or settling business disputes (Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010). 
These networks also help private firms to protect against lack of ownership rights, 
contract laws, and arbitrary enforcement of business regulations (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 
2006). A system where actors draw disproportionately on “closed business networks” 
with friends, relations and national bureaucrats to compensate for the shortage of formal 
institutions magnifies the return to political rent-seeking by this elite, and is conducive to 
corruption, as it provides the right environment for sealing and honoring corrupt deals 
(Fischer & Reuber, 2007; Morck & Yeung, 2004).  
On the other hand, in former and current socialist countries, the state still plays a 
larger role in distributing scarce resources; compared with SOEs, privately-owned SMEs 
receive little support from the government and typically lack market legitimacy. In such 
countries, the market mechanism often coexists with (and is impacted by) a government-
led redistributive mechanism, suggesting that government officials still have a strong 
influence on business practices (Boisot & Child; Li & Zhang, 2007; Nguyen et al., 2005). 
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The political dimension has a greater impact on entrepreneurs’ action in a country like 
China, where the state plays a larger role in distributing scarce resources, as “the party-
state is crucial to just about everything that a business needs to obtain or know about: 
land, energy, accounting standards, tax regimes, implementation of regulations or bank 
loans. It is also the key integrator of China and its market, and is the sole conduit for 
hearing political demands and settling political differences” (Story, 2012). 
Managers’ ties with government officials—the official networks—represent a 
special type of managerial resource in these countries (Chung, 2006; Li & Zhang, 2007; 
Nguyen, Le, & Freeman, 2006; M. Peng & Luo, 2000). They help private firms to 
navigate through cumbersome procedures with state agencies, gain access to scarce 
resources, and enter closely-regulated industries, and thereby improve their business 
performance (Chung, 2006; M. Peng, 2001; M. Peng & Luo, 2000; Xin & Pearce, 1996). 
This is evidenced in various emerging economies (M. Peng, 2001), such as China (Li & 
Zhang, 2007; M. Peng & Luo, 2000; Xin & Pearce, 1996), Vietnam (Le and Nguyen 
2009), and Eastern European countries (Smallbone & Welter, 2001). Story (2012) even 
states that “Cultivating relations with officials is not just a fact of life for doing business 
in the mainland (China) - it can mean the difference between success or failure”. 
Hypothesis 1: Post-IPO performance increases with the listed entrepreneurial 
firm’s bridging social capital, specifically the political connections of the founder and 
his/her team. 
Another important feature of emerging markets is the prevalence of large 
blockholders in listed companies, a very different situation from the Berles and Means 
thesis (1932). As a result, conflicts between large internal shareholders and small external 
shareholders become the predominant corporate governance issue in those markets. 
Classence et al. (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002) (on Asian listed companies), 
and Faccio and Lang (Faccio & Lang, 2002) (on European listed companies) both find 
that the market tends to discount the stock price of companies that have more severe 
conflicts of interests between insiders and outsiders. Some controlling shareholders, 
aware that the relationships and interactions between controlling internal shareholders 
and small external shareholders is of crucial importance to the firm’s long-run 
performance, make various attempts to mitigate small external shareholders’ concerns by 
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voluntarily submitting themselves to scrutiny by external shareholders, for instance 
through promoting the role of the shareholders’ meeting and the board (Wan & Ong, 
2005), increasing board independence (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990), improving 
information disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003) and auditing quality (Becker, Defond, 
Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998), or paying out more dividends (Chen, Cheung, 
Stouraitis, & Wong, 2005; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001), which will eventually enhance 
the firms’ value. Also, external shareholders are also becoming more active in exerting 
influence on their firms, not only by monitoring but also by advising and providing 
business connections. In that sense, the checks and balance, advice and other resources 
provided by external shareholders can be viewed as the benefits received by internal 
controlling shareholders through the bridging social capital built up by the latter with the 
former. However, the entrepreneur/controller’s attitudes towards external investors vary 
considerably from one company to another. While some are open and willing to share 
power with outsiders, others still prefer tight control and low transparency. As explained 
in the first section, given the regulatory restriction on secondary sale of existing shares 
and the 3-year lock-in period for founders, cashing in is not an option for the founder at 
the time of the IPO. Therefore, more shares floated to the public during the IPO can be 
considered to indicate that the entrepreneur/controller is open to external shareholders, 
and willing to dilute his/her position, with the possible result of more intensive 
monitoring. 
Hypothesis 2: The post-IPO performance increases with the listed entrepreneurial 
firm’s external investor bridging social capital, measured by the percentage of shares 
floated during the IPO. 
 
Bonding Social Capital and Firm Performance 
 
  
 In contrast to the bridging view of social capital as a resource located in the 
external linkages of a focal actor, the bonding view focuses on collective actors' internal 
characteristics. In these views, the social capital of a collectivity (organization, 
community, nation, and so forth) lies not so much in that collectivity's external ties to 
other external actors as in its internal structure—in the linkages between individuals or 
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groups within the collectivity and, specifically, in those features that give the collectivity 
cohesiveness and thereby facilitate the pursuit of collective goals (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Dense connections between parties in a group or collective enhance self-enforcing values 
and behaviors, allowing the group to function and achieve common goals (Carolis et al., 
2009). 
 In the context of emerging economies, the accumulation of bonding social capital 
may create more value for the entrepreneur. As seen earlier, most of these countries have 
poorly-developed formal institutions (North, 1990), and this influences not only the 
effectiveness of regulation and enforcement, but also the availability of external financial 
and labor resources. When institutional efficiency is low, there will be more “relational 
contracting”, i.e. relationship-based, personalized exchanges, while arm’s-length 
transactions are more prevalent in a high-efficiency institutional context (M. W. Peng, 
2003). Consistent with the above theories, Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that diversified 
business groups in India generally outperform their peers due to the existence of an intra-
group “internal market”; this can act as a substitute for external capital and labor markets, 
ultimately mitigating market failures caused by agency and information problems when 
the institutions that contribute to the efficiency of input and output markets are under-
developed. In such cases, the entrepreneur/controlling shareholder’s bonding social 
capital is beneficial for the post-issue performance of IPO firms.  
 However, there is an alternative, dark side to this “internal market”. Many 
entrepreneurs pursue overall value maximization for the whole business group, 
sometimes at the expense of external investors holding shares in one particular listed 
entity of the business group (Chang, 2003). When this happens, the accumulation of 
bonding social capital through intensive intra-group connections could have a negative 
impact on a listed entity’s post-IPO performance. 
 Related party transactions have been widely used as a measure of intra-group 
connections, and researchers find they are one of the main channels through which 
controlling shareholders attempt to prop up listed companies (Friedman, Johnson, & 
Mitton, 2003) or tunnel them (Johnson, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Even 
when the aim is to prop up rather than to tunnel, a greater number of related party 
transactions will also hamper the listed entity’s independence and cause a soft budget 
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constraint issue, which will make the companies unaccountable and inefficient (Kornai, 
1979; Stiglitz, 1994). 
 In this study, we use the intensity of an entrepreneurial firm’s related party 
transactions within its business group as a proxy for intra-group bonding social capital. 
Although the existing theories presented earlier do not provide any grounds for a 
directional link between bonding social capital and the post-IPO firm performance, we do 
expect the former to have some (positive or negative) impact on the latter. Fischer and 
Reuber (2007), for example, developed the notion of reputational “stickiness”, which 
means that evaluations (positive or negative) become entrenched such that they have an 
ongoing impact on the firm’s performance.  
Based on this theoretical prediction, the overall relationship between intra-group 
related party transactions and the post-IPO performance of the sample companies will 
depend on the relative magnitude of positive and negative effects. 
Hypothesis 3: Post-IPO performance is impacted by the listed entrepreneurial 
firm’s bonding social capital, measured by the intensity of intra-group related party 
transactions. 
Methodology 
Data and Sample 
 
Our sample includes all entrepreneurial firms that conducted IPOs from the initial 
establishment of the Chinese stock market in 1996 until 2007. This cut-off year is chosen 
to allow for inclusion of three years of post-IPO data. Unlike their state-owned 
counterparts, privately-owned entrepreneurial companies have full autonomy in making 
their IPO decision, which is driven entirely by economic rather than political 
considerations.  
In China, there are two ways for private companies to become listed on the stock 
market: by an IPO or by “backdoor” listing, for example through a reverse takeover. Our 
sample does not include backdoor-listed private firms, as information on their pre-listing 
performance is not available. It includes all IPO firms with available data on financials 
and corporate governance for three years before and three years after the IPO year. The 
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final sample consists of 181 private firm IPOs. The time distribution of the IPOs is shown 
in Table 1.  
 
(Insert Table 1 around here) 
 
Description of Variables  
  
Return on assets (ROA) is used as the main measure of accounting performance, 
and return on equity (ROE) is used as a robustness check. ROA is a popular measure of 
profitability and the efficiency of asset utilization, while ROE measures the return for 
shareholders. However, ROA and ROE for the period immediately after an IPO have a 
downward bias, as the proceeds raised will increase assets immediately but there will be a 
time lag before the proceeds are invested and the output of those investments translates 
into net income. We control for this bias by adding IPO proceeds as a percentage of pre-
IPO equity in a regression analysis. The pre-IPO (post-IPO) accounting performance is 
measured by the average ROA and ROE for the three consecutive years before (after) the 
IPO year, while the change in accounting performance is the difference between the 
average ROA and ROE before and after the IPO. For market performance, we use the 
post-IPO 3-year abnormal stock return, which is the sample company’s stock return 
during the period of three calendar years starting from the first trading day after the IPO, 
net of market returns during the same period. 
As presented in the hypothesis development section, we use three proxies to 
capture the entrepreneur’s social capital: 
(1) Political connections of the entrepreneur and the top management5 (dummy variable 
equal to one if the entrepreneur or one of the management team has political connections, 
defined as whether the person has past working experience in government or state-owned 
enterprises, is a member of the National People’s Congress or National Political 
                                                
5Usually, in Chinese entrepreneurial companies, the founders are actively involved in the management of 
their firms. Of the 82 sample companies that have political bridging social capital, there are only 5 in which 
the entrepreneurs do not occupy any management position. It could be argued that that these firms still 
display the entrepreneur’s efforts to build political bridging social capital by engaging managers with such 
social capital. 
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Consultative Conference, or a Chairman of a National Industry Association). This 
variable is the proxy for the entrepreneur’s political bridging social capital. 
(2) Percentage of new shares floated as a measure of existing shareholders’ ownership 
retention. As secondary sale is not allowed in a Chinese IPO and only new shares can be 
issued to the public, the percentage of new shares floated directly indicates the ownership 
retention of existing shareholders, and their willingness to share power with incoming 
external investors. This variable is the proxy for the entrepreneur’s external investor 
bridging social capital. 
(3) Intensity of intra-group transactions, measured by the ratio of total related party 
transactions in the three post-IPO years over total sales in the three post-IPO years. This 
variable is the proxy for the entrepreneur’s intra-group bonding social capital.  
 When we run the regression analysis, we also control for the following corporate 
governance and financial variables influencing firm performance: 
(1) whether the chairman of the board is also the CEO (dummy); 
(2) the change in managerial shareholdings before and after the IPO; 
(3) board size (natural log of number of board directors); 
(4) board independence (ratio of number of independent directors over total number of 
board directors); 
(5) IPO proceeds as percentage of pre-IPO equity; 
(6) total assets in log form; 




Table 2 and Figure 1 summarize the change in accounting performance and 
market performance before and after the IPO year. The mean and median differences in 
ROA before and after the IPO are -6.13% and -5.40% respectively, and the change is 
statistically significant in terms of both the t-test and the Wilcoxon sign rank test.  The 
ROE shows an even more significant post-IPO decline relative to its pre-IPO level. 
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One possible explanation for the post-IPO decline in accounting performance is 
that the investments of the IPO proceeds may not give quick payoffs. Therefore, we also 
look at three other measures: change in sales as a percentage of the pre-IPO level, change 
in asset turnover (the ratio of sales over total assets), and gross margin. The mean and 
median changes in sales are 213.28% and 147.23% respectively, which indicates that 
more than half of the sample companies doubled their sales after their IPO. The asset 
turnover rate drops significantly after the IPO, indicating that asset utilization declined 
even though sales increased significantly. Altogether, the summary statistics show that 
the overall accounting performance deteriorates after an IPO despite strong sales growth, 
which is consistent with the findings in the extant literature (Jain & Kini, 1994; 
Mikkelson et al., 1997). However, the possibility that post-IPO investment has not yet 
translated into increased sales cannot be ruled out without running the multivariate 
regression by controlling for other contributing factors. 
Regarding market performance, the mean and median 3-year abnormal stock 
returns are 22.0% and -14.1% respectively, indicating that more than half of the sample 
firms were outperformed by the market during the 3-year post-IPO period. 
  
(Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 around here) 
 
 Panel B Table 2 reports the social capital characteristics of the sample firms. In 
total, 82 firms have built up political bridging social capital; 58 of these firms began this 
before the IPO, and 32 after the IPO6.  On average the sample firms issue 30% new 
shares to external investors. Regarding the intra-group bonding social capital, the related 
party transactions represent an average 0.64% of the sales in value. 
 Panel C Table 2 shows the sample firms’ corporate governance and financial 
characteristics. For 23.76% of the sample firms, the chairman of the board is also the 
CEO. The average number of directors on the board is 9.12, and 22.2% of directors are 
independent.  
Before the regression analysis, we first conduct univariate tests to investigate the 
relationship between social capital and accounting and market performance. The results 
                                                
6 Among these 32 firms, 8 have already had pre-IPO political bridging social capital. 
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are reported in Table 3. The sample is broken down by (1) overall political bridging 
social capital, (2) external investor bridging social capital, (3) intra-group bonding social 
capital. Univariate tests show that political bridging social capital has a strong bearing on 
both accounting and market performance after an IPO, while for external investor 
bridging social capital, and intra-group bonding social capital, the effect is less 
substantial. 
 
(Insert Table 3 around here) 
 
Post-IPO accounting performance and the firm’s social capital 
 
We now relate the change in accounting performance to firms’ social capital 
proxies by an OLS regression analysis. The results are reported in Table 4.  
 
(Insert Table 4 around here) 
 
The dummy variable political bridging social capital variable is positively and 
significantly associated with the change in ROA, indicating that in an emerging and 
transitional economy like China, the political dimension of bridging social capital is 
vitally important for entrepreneurial firms’ performance.  
Secondly, the percentage of new shares issued (external investor bridging social 
capital) is also significantly and positively associated with the change in ROA. This result 
implies that internal controlling shareholders’ openness and willingness to share power 
with external shareholders will create bridging social capital, which favors the post-IPO 
performance. 
The coefficient for related party transaction intensity (intra-group bonding social 
capital) is significant and negative, indicating that the more related party transactions a 
firm conducts, the worse the post-IPO accounting performance is. 
Note that in column one, the independent variables only include social capital 
variables, and control variables with financial characteristics. Corporate governance 
characteristics are added to the regression model in column 2. Control variables also 
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include two variables related to the IPO first-day return, since in China during our study 
period, the IPO issue price was determined by the regulator based on a fixed PE ratio, and 
the first-day return reflects investors’ expectations of the firms’ future performance rather 
than firms’ decision to leave money on the table. Furthermore, to capture the investors’ 
impression of the overall market performance, we use not only the sample firm’s IPO 
first-day return, but also the average IPO first-day return of all companies conducting an 
IPO in the same month our sample company went public. In addition, as discussed before, 
there may be a time lag before the IPO proceeds are invested and the outputs of those 
investments translate into net income: we control for that factor by adding the ratio of 
IPO proceeds over pre-IPO equity of the sample firm. With all the control variables 
added, the direction and significance of coefficients for the social capital variables remain 
stable.   
In the unreported robustness check, we also test the change in ROE performance. 
The results remain broadly similar. 
The Endogeneity issue and Causality 
 
Since entrepreneurs do not randomly establish social capital, there is an 
endogeneity concern. To better understand the relationship between social capital and 
post-IPO performance, the issue of endogeneity needs to be addressed.  
Regarding the percentage of shares floated - our proxy for external investor 
bridging social capital - an alternative explanation is that the causal relationship runs 
from post-IPO performance to shares floated, as founders usually have the information 
advantage and are better able to predict future performance. However, if that is the case, 
we should see a negative association between the percentage of shares floated and post-
IPO performance, because if insider information leads the founder to anticipate a drop in 
performance, he will try to sell more shares to the public in the IPO, and vice versa.  
 For political bridging social capital, the reverse causality explanation would be 
that a firm with better performance is better able to develop political connections. To 
address this concern, we split political connections into those developed pre-IPO and 
post-IPO. Post-IPO political connections are more likely to be developed by firms with 
superior post-IPO firm performance.  
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58 of our sample firms have pre-IPO political connections while 32 have post-IPO 
political connections. It is interesting to note that pre- and post-IPO political connections 
overlap for very few sample firms. Of the 58 firms with pre-IPO political connections, 
only 8 developed further political connections post-IPO, indicating that pre- and post-IPO 
political connections are substitutes, and those companies without pre-IPO political 
connections are more eager to develop them after the IPO.   
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 respectively report pre-IPO and post-IPO political 
connections; the coefficient remains significant, but the significance declines slightly 
compared with Column 1 or 2. The reason is that as the firms with pre- and post-IPO 
political connections seldom overlap, then the two dummies indicate the contrast not only 
between firms with and without political connections, but also between firms with pre- 
and post-IPO political connections when both have superior performances. These 
findings show that endogeneity is not likely to be a serious issue here. However, for 
reasons of prudence, the following analysis focuses solely on pre-IPO political 
connections. There is arguably still a possibility that good prospects are more likely to 
attract managers with political connections to join the entrepreneurial company. As we 
only look at the post-IPO performance change net of pre-IPO performance, that concern 
can be greatly mitigated. Meanwhile, the time lag between pre-IPO political bridging 
social capital and post-IPO performance makes causation clearer. For the intra-group 
bonding social capital proxy, i.e. related party transaction intensity, as there are 
contradictory theoretical predictions regarding its effect on post-IPO performance, 
endogeneity is less likely to be an issue.  
Post-IPO market performance and the firm’s social capital 
 
After an investigation into the effect of social capital on the post-IPO accounting 
performance of Chinese entrepreneurial companies, we explore whether those factors 
have a bearing on post-IPO market performance. 
 
(Insert Table 5 around here) 
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In Table 5, the dependent variable is the post-IPO 3-year abnormal stock return, 
which is the sample company’s stock return during the period of three calendar years 
starting the next trading day after the IPO, net of the market return during the same 
period. If a firm undertakes an IPO on April 1st 2005, then this period runs from April 2nd 
2005 (if it is a trading day) to April 2nd 2008 (or if that day is not a trading day, the last 
trading day prior to April 2nd 2008). The market return is calculated as the arithmetic 
mean return for all stocks outstanding on the market during the same period. If the 
alternative measure of weighted average market return is used, the results remain stable.    
The independent variables are largely the same as in Table 4, except that firm size 
is now proxied by the average year-end market value (in log form) during the three-year 
period. We also control for accounting performance by using the post-IPO change in 
ROA, since higher abnormal stock returns may simply be due to better accounting 
performance. Table 5 shows that the percentage of shares floated is not significant. 
However, the direction and significance of the coefficients for pre-IPO political social 
bridging capital and intra-group bonding social capital show that these two factors have 
the same impact on market performance as on accounting performance.  
Determinants of Entrepreneur’s Establishment of Social Capital 
  
 What types of entrepreneurial firms are most likely to establish social capital? 
Table 6 reports regression results that link the probability of establishing social capital. 
While overall, no variables are related to the likelihood of a firm establishing social 
capital, the chairman/CEO is more likely to build pre-political connections, but less likely 
to share power with external investors in issuing additional portions of shares. On the 
other hand, poor pre-IPO performance firms are more likely to issue greater portions of 
new shares. 
 Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that establishment of social capital is not 
motivated by firm performance, quality or corporate governance considerations. This 
means our previous findings are unaffected by endogeneity concerns: high-quality firms 




The empirical results obtained in the statistical analysis above clearly validate the 
hypotheses we developed based on social capital theory. The results for political bridging 
social capital and intra-group bonding social capital are consistent and statistically 
significant for both post-IPO accounting and post-IPO market performance; while the 
positive impact of external investor bridging social capital is significant for accounting 
performance, but not for market performance. It is important to note that all these results 
are obtained after controlling for major firm-level corporate governance and financial 
characteristics that have been proved in previous literature to impact firm performance. 
Firstly, we find that political social capital is positively associated with post-IPO 
accounting and market performance. This suggests that in China, like other transitional 
and emerging economies, political bridging social capital plays an important role in the 
growth of entrepreneurial firms, given that the State still controls the lion’s share of 
economic resources (Story, 2012) and entrepreneurs often feel insecure about their 
legitimacy in society (Li & Zhang, 2007).  
Secondly, the percentage of shares issued is significantly and positively 
associated with a change in post-IPO accounting performance, although this link is not 
validated for post-IPO market performance. As explained previously, in China the type II 
agency problem is predominant, as opposed to the US where the type I agency problem 
predominates. Therefore, the internal controlling shareholder may create a stronger 
external investor bridging social capital by issuing more shares. External investors tend to 
play their monitoring and consulting roles more actively, and to help the listed 
entrepreneurial firm improve corporate governance quality. As a result, the firm does 
better in its accounting performance. 
Thirdly, the intensity of related party transactions after the IPO is found to be 
significantly and negatively associated with the post-IPO accounting and market 
performance. As related party transactions capture the intra-group bonding social capital, 
this evidence suggests that although intra-group bonding social capital may add value to 
the whole business group controlled by the entrepreneur through the “internal market”, 
the negative effect, i.e. lack of independence and accountability and a likelihood of 






This paper examines the post-IPO accounting and market performance of 
entrepreneurial listed firms in China. The uniqueness of China’s regulatory and 
institutional background allows us to examine the role played by the entrepreneur’s social 
capital in these two types of performance.  
We find that political bridging social capital improves the post-IPO accounting 
and market performance, while the intra-group bonding social capital has an adverse 
effect on both types of performance. We also find that external investor bridging social 
capital has a positive impact on the accounting performance.  
Our study contributes both to the entrepreneurial finance literature and to social 
capital studies. 
Unlike most existing literature in this field drawing exclusively on agency theory, 
this study takes a new angle to analyze entrepreneurial firm performance in the context of 
an emerging and transitional economy. We develop and test several proxies for social 
capital in the context of China’s capital market. Specifically, the distinguishing feature of 
emerging economies is their low institutional efficiency and the prevalence of the 
relational contract. Social capital therefore exerts a huge influence on firms’ performance, 
and in sharp contrast, formal governance mechanisms such as board size or board 
independence have no explanatory power for IPO performance. For a transitional 
economy, the still influential role of the state and the relatively low legitimacy of private 
firms further add to the importance of political social capital. Moreover, the concentrated 
ownership structure in these economies makes the relationship between controlling 
internal shareholders and small external shareholders another important dimension of 
social capital. The prevalence of business groups in emerging economies leads to the 
issue of interaction between the business group and its listed entities.  
We find that political bridging social capital, as the most important type of social 
capital, helps improve companies’ post-IPO performance, while the bridging social 
capital developed from interaction between controlling internal shareholders and small 
external shareholders is also beneficial for post-IPO performance. However, the bonding 
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social capital deriving from the connections between the business group and the listed 
entity reduce the firm’s post-IPO performance. 
In sum, we put forward three measures that capture specific aspects of social 
capital in an emerging and transitional economy and further link them to the post-IPO 
performance of entrepreneurial companies. This enhances the understanding of social 
capital and its impact on entrepreneurial companies’ post-IPO performance, and therefore 
add to both the entrepreneurial finance and the social capital literature. 
Practical Implications 
 
In addition to its academic contribution, this study also yields strong practical 
implications.  
Firstly, for entrepreneurs in an emerging and transitional economy, acquiring 
adequate political bridging social capital needs to be understood as part of the business 
strategy. The win-win cooperation between internal and external shareholders is of 
crucial importance to firm performance, and attention should also be paid to “investor 
relations” with small external shareholders. Furthermore, the benefit and cost of intra-
group bonding capital should be carefully balanced. Although related party transactions 
may benefit the listed entity and the whole group in some circumstances, their “dark side” 
should not be ignored, especially as regards the interests of external shareholders who 
only invest in the listed entity. 
For investors, our findings provide some insights to help screen promising and 
trustworthy entrepreneurial companies from the pool. Moreover, with the promotion of 
“investor activism”, our findings can also be a roadmap for external investors if they 
intend to scrutinize the firms’ management more closely. 
For regulators and policymakers in emerging and/or transitional economies, the 
first implication of our findings is that development of the market economy and 
construction of formal institutions should be the highest priorities. Although political 
social capital benefits entrepreneurial companies, there are of course side-effects. In the 
long run, such “relational transactions” need to gradually recede and be replaced by 
“arm’s-length transactions”.  The second implication is that regulators can play an 
effective role in the protection of small external investors and monitoring the internal 
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controlling shareholders’ behavior, and thus facilitating win-win cooperation between 
them. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
 Despite the above contributions both to theory and practice, this study presents 
some limitations, which also indicate some directions for future research. 
 Firstly, our study focuses on China. Although China is the largest and fastest-
growing emerging transitional economy in the world, the generalizability of our 
conclusion requires further testing for other economies. A cross-country comparison 
between various emerging and transitional economies is therefore one possible direction 
for future study.  
Secondly, there is the issue of the validity of variable measurement. Our measures 
probably capture only a few aspects of social capital. Given the breadth and complexity 
of social capital, future research could use the theoretical framework constructed in this 
study to develop appropriate social capital measures for each country’s unique 
institutional environment.  
Thirdly, this study examines the associations between social capital and 
entrepreneurial firm performance. However, the impact of social capital is profound and 
systematic, and it would thus be interesting to link social capital with other outcome 
measures such as access to resources, firm riskiness, and the probability and ease of 
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Table 1: Summary of IPOs and IPO characteristics by Year 
Year No. of IPOs Percentage of total 





1996 4 2.17% 83.50 171.52% 
1997 16 8.08% 187.00 158.64% 
1998 6 6.06% 278.00 229.62% 
1999 10 10.64% 374.00 136.90% 
2000 22 16.30% 446.00 155.44% 
2001 9 11.39% 398.00 176.58% 
2002 10 14.71% 342.00 90.94% 
2003 15 22.39% 333.00 57.01% 
2004 36 36.00% 265.00 68.12% 
2005 7 50.00% 247.00 22.55% 
2006 29 43.94% 279.00 97.65% 
2007 17 13.49% 332.00 213.83% 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics  
 
Panel A Change in accounting and market performance 
Stats Mean Median T test Wilcoxon sign 
rank test 
Change in sales as percentage 
of pre-IPO sales 
213.28% 147.23% 10.26  11.51  
Change in asset turnover -0.32  -0.29  -7.79  -10.12  
Change in ROA -6.13% -5.40% -15.40  -11.17  
Change in ROE -5.74% -2.78% -20.34  -11.53  
Post-IPO 3-year abnormal 
stock return 
22.0% -14.1% - - 
     
 
Panel B Social capital variables 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Political bridging social capital (dummy variable) 0.27 0.00 0.45 
Pre-IPO political bridging social capital (dummy variable) .33 0.00 .47 
Post-IPO political bridging social capital (dummy 
variable) 
.18 0.00 .38 
External investor bridging social capital (Percentage of 
new shares issued) 
30.21% 28.00% 6.37% 
Intra-group bonding social capital (related party 
transactions) 
.64% .37% .88% 
 
Panel C Corporate Governance and financial Characteristics  
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Chairman is CEO  23.76% 0.00% 42.68% 
Number of board directors 9.12 9.00 2.41 
Number of independent directors as percentage of total	   22.20% 33.33% 17.45% 
Proceeds raised as percentage of pre-IPO equity 258.51% 225.21% 157.11% 
Ln(total asset) 19.44 19.38 0.67 





Table 3 Univariate test results  
 
Panel A  
 Firms with no political 
bridging social capital 
Firms with political 
bridging social capital 
T test  Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
test  mean p50 mean p50 
Change in sales as 
percentage of pre-IPO 
sales 
1.83  1.37  2.56  1.68  -1.71*  -1.25  
Change in asset turnover -0.39  -0.36  -0.22  -0.18  -2.10** -3.29***  
Change in ROA -0.07  -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -2.75*** -3.39***  
Change in ROE -0.18  -0.17  -0.15  -0.13  -2.07**  -2.34**  
Post-IPO 3-year 
abnormal stock return 
-0.01  -0.14  0.49  -0.12  -1.33  -1.11  
No. Obs.  99   82   	  
 
Panel B 
 Firms with low external 
investor bridging social 
capital  
Firms with high 
external investor 
bridging social capital  
T test  Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
test 
stats mean p50 mean p50 
Change in sales as 
percentage of pre-IPO 
sales 
2.01  1.42  2.24  1.53  -0.57  -0.09  
Change in asset turnover -0.39  -0.35  -0.27  -0.24  -1.46  -1.91*  
Change in ROA -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  -0.05  -1.33  -0.90  
Change in ROE -0.17  -0.15  -0.17  -0.16  0.14  0.36  
Post-IPO 3-year 
abnormal stock return 
0.52  0.02  -0.05  -0.20  1.58  1.90*  
No. Obs. 85  96    
 
Panel E 
 Firms with low intra-
group bonding social 
capital  
Firms with high intra-
group bonding social 
capital  
T test  Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
test 
stats mean p50 mean p50 
Change in sales as 
percentage of pre-IPO 
sales 
2.53  1.55  1.73  1.37  1.95*  1.41  
Change in asset turnover -0.28  -0.26  -0.36  -0.33  0.89  1.00  
Change in ROA -0.06  -0.05  -0.06  -0.05  0.51  0.43  
Change in ROE -0.16  -0.15  -0.18  -0.16  0.84  0.72  
Post-IPO 3-year 
abnormal stock return 
0.49  -0.12  -0.05  -0.17  1.50  0.79  
No. Obs. 91  90    
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Table 4 OLS regression of the effect of social capital on post-IPO accounting 
performance 
Dependant variable Change in ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Political bridging social 
capital 
0.026*** 0.023***    
 (3.417) (3.084)    
Pre-IPO Political bridging 
social capital 
  0.017*  0.025*** 
   (1.972)  (2.616) 
Post-IPO political bridging 
social capital 
   0.022**  0.015 
    (2.074)    (1.387) 
External investor bridging 
social capital 
0.260*** 0.269*** 0.282*** 0.279*** 0.341*** 
 (4.095) (3.968) (4.089) (4.056)    (4.274) 
Intra-group bonding social 
capital 
-0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015** 
 (-4.015) (-4.017) (-3.727) (-3.605)    (-2.539) 
Proceeds raised -0.010*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008*   -0.009** 
 (-3.148) (-2.236) (-2.220) (-1.919)    (-2.040) 
Ln (total assets) 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.039** 
 (2.908) (3.317) (3.320) (3.372)    (-2.211) 
If CEO is chairman  0.007 0.006 0.012    0.002 
  (0.754) (0.659) (1.358)    (0.168) 
Board size  -0.025 -0.025 -0.028*   -0.039** 
  (-1.458) (-1.452) (-1.671)    (-2.211) 
Board independence  -0.054 -0.050 -0.048    -0.078 
  (-0.908) (-0.824) (-0.813)    (-1.346) 
IPO first-day return (firm)  0.007 0.007 0.009    0.004 
  (1.047) (0.993) (1.460)    (0.623) 
IPO first-day return (market)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000    0.000 
  (-0.477) (-0.430) (-0.515)    (0.299) 
constant -0.453*** -0.491*** -0.500*** -0.510*** -0.485*** 
 (-3.527) (-3.330) (-3.329) (-3.424)    (-3.171) 
Adjusted R2 0.279 0.278 0.251 0.249    0.341 
F statistic 5.095 4.085 3.687 3.741    3.293 




Table 5 OLS regression of the effect of social capital on post-IPO market performance 
Dependent variable Post-IPO 3-year stock abnormal return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Political bridging social 
capital 
0.835** 0.853**    
 (2.224) (2.093)    
Pre-IPO Political bridging 
social capital 
  1.022**  1.187**  
   (2.248)  (2.504)    
Post-IPO political bridging 
social capital 
   1.452*** 1.351**  
    (2.704)    (2.597)    
External investor bridging 
social capital 
-0.586 -1.582 -1.172 -2.132    -0.299    
 (-0.183) (-0.425) (-0.315) (-0.590)    (-0.071)    
Intra-group bonding social 
capital 
-0.446** -0.466** -0.431* -0.418*   -0.547*   
 (-2.109) (-2.048) (-1.921) (-1.948)    (-1.908)    
Proceeds raised -0.140 -0.099 -0.122 -0.034    -0.144    
 (-0.886) (-0.506) (-0.616) (-0.183)    (-0.688)    
Ln (market value) 1.806*** 1.879*** 1.872*** 1.810*** 1.526*** 
 (5.323) (5.112) (5.104) (5.074)    (4.290)    
If CEO is chairman  -0.119 -0.191 0.027    0.078    
  (-0.247) (-0.396) (0.059)    (0.162)    
Board size  -0.627 -0.584 -0.719    -0.102    
  (-0.707) (-0.660) (-0.856)    (-0.117)    
Board independence  -2.078 -1.773 -2.190    -3.766    
  (-0.683) (-0.584) (-0.752)    (-1.321)    
IPO first-day return (firm)  0.166 0.097 0.230    -0.057    
  (0.538) (0.312) (0.799)    (-0.183)    
IPO first-day return 
(market) 
 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002    0.001    
  (-0.329) (-0.254) (-0.310)    (0.163)    
Change in ROA  0.708 1.374 1.837    -2.422    
  (0.167) (0.332) (0.465)    (-0.573)    
constant -37.226*** -36.398*** -36.295*** -34.920*** -29.937*** 
 (-5.042) (-4.403) (-4.401) (-4.358)    (-3.682)    
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.122 0.126 0.143    0.277    
F statistic 2.855 2.065 2.104 2.314    2.654    
No. Obs. 173 169 169 175    169    
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social capital   
 Logit  logit logit OLS OLS 
      
If CEO is 
chairman 
0.45 1.398** -0.739 -0.018* 0.027    
  -0.88 (2.289) (-0.944) (-1.973) (0.205)    
Board size -0.443 -0.388 -0.582 0.042** -0.107    
  (-0.459) (-0.358) (-0.363) (2.456) (-0.419)    
Board 
independence 
1.95 1.839 -1.682 -0.034 0.382    
  (0.698) (0.632) (-0.435) (-0.660) (0.503)    
ln_asset -0.271 -0.434 -0.353 -0.039*** 0.113    
 (-0.785) (-1.052) (-0.732) (-6.169) (1.200)    
average pre-ipo 
roa 
-7.708 -6.184 -9.502 -0.512*** -1.678    
 (-1.539) (-1.094) (-1.169) (-6.003) (-1.326)    
constant 25.053*** 27.872 10.801 0.872*** -0.831    
 (3.508) . (1.032) (6.479) (-0.416)    
      
Adjusted R2    0.531 0.465    
F statistic    7.146 5.730    
No. Obs. 148 148 98 175 175 
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